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Abstract
Bank deposits in jurisdictions with banking secrecy constitute an e¤ective tool to evade taxes on
interest income. A recent EU reform reduces the scope for this type of tax evasion by introducing a
source tax on interest income earned by EU residents in Switzerland and several other jurisdictions
with banking secrecy. In this paper, we estimate the impact of the source tax on Swiss bank deposits
held by EU residents while using that non-EU residents were not subject to the tax to apply a
natural experiment methodology. We nd that the 15% source tax caused Swiss bank deposits
of EU residents to drop by more than 40% with most of the response occurring in two quarters
immediately before and after the source tax was introduced. The estimates imply an elasticity of
Swiss deposits with respect to the net-of-source-tax-rate in the range 2.5-3.
Keywords: Tax evasion, Capital taxation, Savings Directive
A previous version of this paper has circulated with the title Tax Evasion and Foreign Bank Deposits - Evidence from
a Natural Experiment
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1 Introduction
In recent years, tax evasion has moved to the center of academic debates about tax policy. Increasingly,
it has been recognized that behavioral responses to taxation take many other forms than labor supply
responses. This is conrmed by Feldstein (1995) and others who consistently nd that taxable income
is much more responsive to taxation than labor supply. This nding has spurred an interest in the wide
array of behavioral responses to taxation, notably tax avoidance and tax evasion.
It is often argued that residence-based capital taxes are particularly susceptible to evasion. Since
capital is internationally mobile, e¤ective enforcement requires that tax authorities can obtain infor-
mation about foreign source income. Where information exchange between tax authorities is absent,
households can evade capital taxes simply by placing assets in foreign countries and not reporting the
capital income. A particularly important obstacle to information exchange is banking secrecy. Almost
any banking system includes some elements of secrecy in the sense that banks are required to protect
the privacy of their customers by maintaining condentiality and not disclosing information to ordinary
third parties. In some jurisdictions, however, banking secrecy also severely limits the access to banking
information for tax authorities and in this form banking secrecy clearly impedes e¤ective exchange of
tax relevant information. In this paper, we shall refer to jurisdictions that only to a very limited extent
provide tax relevant information to other countries as o¤shore jurisdictions.
For obvious reasons, no exact measures exist of the revenue loss incurred by governments due to tax
evasion using o¤shore jurisdictions. A recent report from the U.S. senate quotes estimates of the total
assets held by households in o¤shore jurisdictions in the range $5-$11 trillion and reports an estimate of
the resulting global loss of tax revenue at staggering $250 billion annually (U.S. Senate, 2008). Clearly,
the use of o¤shore jurisdictions for tax evasion purposes is a policy issue of rst-order signicance. It
is thus not surprising that the past decade has seen a number of notable policy responses. Individual
countries have launched initiatives including amnesties for evaders disclosing o¤shore assets, criminal
prosecution of bankers assisting with tax evasion and systematic use of bank transfer data, credit card
data and client information acquired from former bank employees to identify holders of undeclared
o¤shore wealth. Even more importantly, the OECD and the EU are both heavily involved in the ght
against tax evasion and have sponsored remarkably ambitious multilateral policy initiatives.
The OECD promotes transparency and strongly encourages o¤shore jurisdictions to conclude bilateral
tax treaties with a scope for information exchange upon request. The OECD initiative has been
immensely successful in the sense that, by 2009, all o¤shore jurisdictions had formally endorsed the
OECD transparency standard and committed to conclude at least 12 bilateral treaties. While this
implies that all o¤shore jurisdictions now have a legal mechanism allowing for provision of banking
information to foreign tax authorities, it does not, by any means, imply that tax evasion has been done
away with. Firstly, the incompleteness of treaty networks implies that tax evaders generally have the
possibility to place assets in a jurisdiction that has no tax treaty with their country of residence. As
noted, the OECD initiative obliges o¤shore jurisdictions to sign no more than 12 bilateral tax treaties
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and since o¤shore jurisdictions have been known to partly meet this obligation by concluding treaties
with each other, the number of countries that are e¤ectively able to request banking information from
a given o¤shore jurisdiction may in some cases be considerably lower than 12. Secondly, under the
OECD guidelines requests for information must relate to a specic tax payer and "...demonstrate the
foreseeable relevance of the information requested..." (OECD, 2002). In other words, information can
only be obtained from the o¤shore jurisdiction when the tax authorities of the residence country have
prior knowledge about illegal transactions and tax evaders can often eliminate the risk of detection by
avoiding transactions that draw the attention of domestic tax authorities.
The EU approach to counter the use of o¤shore jurisdictions for evasion purposes is more pragmatic.
Under the Savings Directive, a number of o¤shore jurisdictions are committed to apply a source tax
to the interest income of EU residents and transfer 75% of the tax revenue to the residence countries.
Importantly, the tax is withheld at the level of the bank paying the interest and tax authorities are not
informed about the identity of the tax payer. In principle, this approach allows for taxation of foreign
source interest income without challenging the banking secrecy of the cooperating o¤shore jurisdictions.
The Savings Directive, however, has a number of loopholes that allow tax evaders to avoid the source
tax. Most obviously, tax evaders may simply move assets to non-cooperating o¤shore jurisdictions.
Alternatively, the formal ownership of assets may be transferred to an o¤shore trust since the Savings
Directive is, loosely speaking, concerned with formal rather than benecial ownership. Finally, bonds
or bank deposits may be replaced with structured nance products with similar characteristics since
the denition of interest income employed by the Savings Directive does not cover the return to such
derivatives.
When considering these policy measures from an optimal policy perspective, the key parameters
relate to the behavioral responses of tax evaders. Generally, it should be expected that policy measures
against tax evasion are associated with an e¢ ciency gain in terms of increased compliance. However,
since policy measures typically target only a subset of all available evasion strategies, such as income
earned in certain jurisdictions as under the OECD initiative or certain income types as under the EU
Savings Directive, they are also likely to be associated with an e¢ ciency loss in terms of substitution
towards alternative evasion strategies.1 Arguably, the size of the compliance e¤ect and the substitution
e¤ect determine the e¢ ciency properties of policy measures against tax evasion. Despite the prolic
policy activity, there is very little available empirical evidence on behavioral responses to changes in the
international tax environment. This paper sets out to produce evidence of this sort.
The main contribution of this paper is to estimate the responses of tax evaders to the Savings
Directive. The analysis is complicated by the furtive nature of tax evasion and the fact that evaded
taxes are not directly observable. We take an indirect approach and estimate the e¤ect on something
presumably closely associated to evasion of taxes on interest income, Swiss bank deposits.2 Several facts
1This resembles the distinction between deterrence e¤ects and switching e¤ects of avoidance policies introduced by Ulph
(2009). Substitution e¤ects are not captured by standard models of tax evasion in the tradition of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) where agents have access to a single evasion strategy, under-reporting of income.
2 Indirect approaches are fairly common in the empirical literature on tax evasion (Slemrod, 2007). For instance,
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suggest a strong link between tax evasion and Swiss bank deposits. Firstly, in the investigation of the
Swiss bank UBS conducted by the U.S. Senate in 2008, UBS admitted to have 20,000 US clients with
Swiss bank accounts of which only 1,000 had disclosed the accounts to the US tax authorities (U.S.
Senate, 2008). Secondly, while Switzerland at least partly broke with its tradition for strict banking
secrecy by endorsing the OECD transparency standard in 2009 as one of the last countries in the world,
it maintained legal institutions highly attractive for foreign tax evaders and staunchly opposed OECD
e¤orts to improve access to banking information throughout the period of our analysis. At the heart
of the protection of foreign tax evaders was the legal principle of dual criminality, which implied that
banking information may only be released by Swiss banks and provided to foreign tax authorities in
criminal cases where the alleged o¤ence would also constitute a criminal act under Swiss law. Since the
simple non-declaration of income is not considered a criminal act under Swiss law, foreign tax evaders
with Swiss bank deposits essentially had legal certainty that banking information was not transmitted
to their country of residence.
We exploit that the Savings Directive increased taxes on Swiss source interest income of tax evaders
resident in EU countries while not directly a¤ecting tax evaders resident outside the EU. This allows us
to apply a natural experiment methodology where the treatment group is EU residents with Swiss bank
deposits and the control group is non-EU residents with Swiss bank deposits. The estimated treatment
e¤ect is large and very robust. Using a number of di¤erent control groups, we consistently nd that the
15% source tax reduced bank deposits of EU residents in Switzerland by more than 40%. Most of the
estimated reduction in Swiss deposits occurred during just two quarters immediately before and after
implementation of the Savings Directive, which strongly supports a causal interpretation of the estimates.
The implied elasticity of Swiss deposits with respect to the net-of-tax rate is in the range 2.5-3. Using
the same methodology, we estimate the impact on bank deposits in two other leading o¤shore centers
covered by the Savings Directive, Luxembourg and Jersey. The results are in line with the estimates for
Switzerland although the e¤ects are somewhat smaller and less precisely estimated.
While our framework does not allow for a rigorous distinction between di¤erent types of behavioral
responses, we argue that the estimated reduction in o¤shore deposits reected substitution towards
other evasion strategies rather than increased compliance. Firstly, most EU countries apply a tax rate
on capital income that by far exceeds the 15% tax on o¤shore source interest income introduced by
the Savings Directive. From the perspective of tax evaders, maintaining an o¤shore bank account thus
clearly dominated compliance in terms of tax costs. Secondly, since the Savings Directive did not include
an amnesty clause, choosing to disclose funds for tax purposes would entail a substantial risk of legal
sanctions relating to tax evasion in previous years. Finally, as discussed above, other evasion strategies
were readily available. Our results may thus be interpreted as an estimate of the substitutability of tax
Pissarides and Weber (1989) estimate a model of food consumption and nd that self-employed spend a larger proportion
of reported income on food than employees. Arguing that this nding reects underreporting of income rather than a
higher propensity to consume food, they obtain an estimate of the size of the black economy. In a more recent paper,
Feldman and Slemrod (2007) apply a similar methodology using di¤erences in charitable giving to identify the degree of
underreporting.
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evasion strategies. Although it is not immediately clear to what extent our quantitative results generalize
to other institutional settings, the high degree of substitutability between di¤erent tax evasion strategies
found in this paper suggests that substitution severely limits the e¤ectiveness of policy measures against
tax evasion.
The paper relates to two previous studies that estimate the e¤ect of tax variables and institutional
variables on patterns of cross-border deposits. Alworth and Andresen (1992) estimate a gravity model
and report modestly sized e¤ects on deposits of the net-of-source-tax-rate. Huizinga and Nicodème
(2004) estimate a panel gravity equation and nd no statistically signicant e¤ects of source taxes in the
preferred specication with source and residence country dummies. A key advantage of our estimates
is that identication derives exclusively from the time variation in source tax rates associated with the
Savings Directive. Due to scarcity of time variation in source tax rates, both previous studies rely
predominantly on cross-country variation.3 A further advantage of our approach is that the di¤erent
treatment of EU and non-EU residents implied by the Savings Directive provides intrajurisdiction
variation in source tax rates that enables us to identify the tax elasticity of foreign deposits in specic
banking jurisdictions. This allows us to focus on Switzerland and other o¤shore jurisdictions where
presumably the majority of foreign deposits is associated with tax evasion so that the estimated tax
elasticity of foreign deposits may be interpreted as an evasion elasticity. Conversely, the existing papers
estimate a single equation with all available bilateral data, which implies that estimates e¤ectively
average tax elasticities of foreign deposits across all banking jurisdictions. These estimates are di¢ cult
to interpret since small tax elasticities of foreign deposits could reect either small evasion elasticities or
a large fraction of deposits being held by non-evaders who are generally una¤ected by source taxes.4
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out institutional details of the international tax
environment and places the Savings Directive in this context. Section 3 describes the deposit data
used in the regressions. Section 4 presents our empirical framework and discusses various threats to
identication. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
3Alworth and Andresen (1992) rely exclusively on cross-border variation. In some specications, Huizinga and Nicodème
(2004) include country xed e¤ects, however, country-pair xed e¤ects would be needed to absorb all non-temporal
variation.
4Two recent papers are directly concerned with the Savings Directive but employ empirical strategies that are very
di¤erent from ours. Hemmelgarn and Nicodème (2009) is a policy paper from the European Commission deploying
national account data, deposit data and government revenue data to assess the impact of the Savings Directive. The
paper uses mostly descriptive methods and concludes that the Savings Directive had no measurable e¤ects. Klautke and
Weichenreider (2008) focus on bonds rather than deposits while exploiting that bonds issued prior to 2001 are outside the
scope of the Savings Directive. The main nding is that exempt bonds are not associated with a lower pre-tax return
than otherwise comparable taxable bonds, which suggests that techniques allowing investors to avoid the provisions of the
Savings Directive are readily available.
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2 Background
Switzerland has a long earned reputation for banking secrecy and there is abundant anecdotal and other
evidence that Swiss banks play an important role in facilitating tax evasion.5 The rst part of this
section describes the international tax environment relevant for households evading taxes on interest
income while highlighting the institutional features that make Swiss bank deposits attractive for tax
evaders. Since we aim to describe the institutional background for the Savings Directive, we focus on
the rules applicable around 2005 when the Savings Directive was implemented. The second part of the
section provides some details on the Savings Directive.
2.1 The international tax environment
Taxation of interest income is generally governed by the residence principle, hence interest income is
taxable in the residence country regardless of where it is earned. To the extent that households do not
self-report foreign source interest income, enforcement of the residence principle requires information ex-
change between tax authorities. OECD (2006) lists two conditions necessary to ensure e¤ective exchange
of information. Firstly, there must be a legal basis for exchange of information. In some countries, do-
mestic law allows tax administrations to share information with foreign tax administrations, but more
commonly the legal basis for information exchange is a bilateral agreement in the form of a Double Tax
Convention or a Tax Information Exchange Agreement. Secondly, domestic tax administrations must
have access to the information requested by foreign tax administrations. In the present context, the
major obstacle is the banking secrecy laws that in some jurisdictions severely restrict access to banking
information for domestic tax authorities.
As noted in the introduction, enforcement of the residence principle may, however, be far from perfect
even when these two conditions are satised. Bilateral agreements typically provide for information
exchange upon requestwhich has the obvious limitation that requests must relate to a specic tax
payer and "...demonstrate the foreseeable relevance of the information requested..." (OECD, 2002). In
other words, information can only be obtained from the source country when the tax authorities of the
residence country have prior knowledge about illegal transactions. Recognizing this limitation, a number
of countries engage in automatic information exchange with at least some partner countries. Clearly,
automatic information exchange does not su¤er from the deciencies of information exchange upon
request since it does not require that the tax authorities of the residence country have prior knowledge
of irregularities.
5One source of evidence is a report from the U.S. Senate on tax haven banks and US tax compliance, which contains
a thorough case study of the role of the Swiss bank UBS in facilitating tax evasion by US residents (U.S. Senate, 2008).
On the nding that Swiss banks have actively marketed secret bank accounts in the US, the report states: "In 2002, UBS
assured its U.S. clients with undeclared accounts that U.S. authorities would not learn of them, because the bank is not
required to disclose them; UBS procedures, practices and services protect against disclosure; and the account information
is further shielded by Swiss bank secrecy laws. Until recently, UBS encouraged its Swiss bankers to travel to the United
States to recruit new U.S. clients, organized events to help them meet wealthy U.S. individuals, and set performance goals
for obtaining new U.S. businesses" (p. 83).
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OECD (2006) provides a summary of the institutional features determining e¤ective information
exchange between tax administrations as of 31 December 2005. Most of the 82 countries in the survey
were committed to provide information upon request to a large number of treaty partners and many
countries moreover provided information to non-treaty partners on the basis of domestic law. Switzerland
stands out as one of the few countries that never provided information to foreign tax authorities in cases
of simple tax evasion. Under the principle of dual criminality, Switzerland only provided information in
criminal cases as dened by the Swiss penal code. The legal standard used to determine criminality in
tax cases was tax fraud dened as tax evasion conducted by means of false documents or the like whereas
the mere non-declaration of income was not considered fraud. In cases passing the dual criminality test,
Switzerland could provide information to any country on the basis of Swiss domestic law. Turning to
banking secrecy, most of the surveyed countries could obtain banking information in all tax matters and
in some countries banks were even required to transmit tax relevant information automatically to the
tax authorities. In Switzerland, the lifting of the banking secrecy was subject to a dual criminality test,
hence Swiss tax authorities did not have access to banking information in cases of simple tax evasion.
In sum, the Swiss information exchange regime and banking secrecy rules o¤ered perfect protection for
foreign tax evaders using Swiss bank accounts to evade taxes on interest income in their country of
residence.
Spurred by external pressure, the Swiss tax environment is currently undergoing profound changes.
In May 2008, a Swiss private banker formerly employed with the Swiss bank UBS was arrested in the
US on charges of conspiring with US residents to evade taxes. In June 2008, a US court demanded that
UBS disclose the names of all US clients with unreported Swiss bank accounts. Meanwhile, the political
pressure on o¤shore jurisdictions was mounting leading to a G20 agreement on a set of economic sanctions
to be employed against o¤shore jurisdictions not complying with the OECD requirements. In March
2009, the Swiss Federal Council nally announced the commitment of Switzerland to adopt the OECD
transparency standard. It is important to emphasize, however, that the current changes of the Swiss tax
environment as well as preceding events that may have led tax evaders to expect future adverse changes
happened after our period of analysis. The Swiss regime with a very limited legal basis for provision of
information to foreign countries and almost impenetrable banking secrecy was in place and essentially
unchallenged throughout the period of our analysis.
A number of other o¤shore jurisdictions o¤ered a level of protection of foreign tax evaders comparable
to Switzerland. Of particular interest are major nancial centers that are covered by the Savings Directive
and for which deposit data is available. In Luxembourg, the lifting of the banking secrecy was subject
to a dual criminality test, however, the legal standard of criminality was somewhat broader than in
Switzerland.6 Just like Switzerland, Luxembourg ended years of opposition to the OECD initiative by
endorsing the transparency standard in March 2009. In Jersey, foreign tax evaders had been protected
6Specically, Luxembourg lifted the banking secrecy in cases of simple non-reporting of interest income when the amount
of evaded taxes was large in absolute terms or relative to the total tax liability (OECD, 2006). KPMG Luxembourg indicate
on their website that tax evasion usually falls under the Luxembourg denition of tax fraud when the evaded amount exceeds
e100.000 or constitutes more than 25% of the total tax liability.
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by a virtual absence of treaty commitments to provide information to foreign jurisdictions. In 2005,
however, a treaty allowing for information exchange upon request was concluded with the US. Clearly,
the signing of the treaty was likely interpreted as a more general policy change towards transparency
and international cooperation and may therefore have induced behavioral responses by tax evaders that
were not directly a¤ected by the treaty.7
2.2 The Savings Directive
The aim of the Savings Directive is to establish e¤ective taxation of the foreign interest income of EU
resident individuals. Initially, it covered 25 EU countries and 15 non-EU jurisdictions of which 5 were
countries (i.e. Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino) and 10 were dependent
territories (i.e. Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey,
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles and the Turks and Caicos Islands). Negotiations between the European
Commission and the 15 non-EU jurisdictions were concluded toward the end of 2004 and the Savings
Directive took e¤ect simultaneously in all participating jurisdictions on 1 July 2005. The EU enlargement
on 1 January 2007 brought the number of participating jurisdictions to 42.
The Savings Directive provides for two alternative regimes of international cooperation based on
automatic information exchange and withholding taxes respectively. The rst regime requires banks to
report interest income earned by foreign EU residents to their local tax authorities who periodically and
automatically convey this information to the tax authorities of the residence country.8 The second regime
requires banks to levy a withholding tax on the interest income of foreign EU residents at 15% in 2005
gradually increasing to 20% in 2008 and 35% in 2011. Importantly, banks remit the taxes to domestic
authorities with no information about the identity of the tax payers who thus remain anonymous. Since
the withholding tax in the source country e¤ectively replaces taxation in the residence country, 75%
of the revenue from the tax is transferred to the residence country. While most EU countries adopted
the information exchange regime, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg as well as most of the non-EU
jurisdictions including Switzerland opted for the withholding tax regime. It should be noted, however,
that in any jurisdiction where the withholding tax regime is the default, individuals may avoid the
withholding tax by accepting that information on interest income be automatically transmitted to their
country of residence. This implies that the withholding tax e¤ectively targets tax evaders unwilling to
disclose tax relevant banking information.
7 In Belgium and Austria, banking secrecy was strict relative to most other OECD countries especially because banking
secrecy was normally only lifted in criminal cases, however, the e¤ective level of protection o¤ered to foreign tax evaders was
considerably lower than in Switzerland, Luxembourg and Jersey. Both countries had extensive treaty networks providing
for information exchange upon request and the absence of a dual criminality test imply that banking secrecy could be lifted
in cases of simple tax evasion if considered a criminal o¤ence in the country requesting information. In the minor nancial
centers Guernsey and the Isle of Man, the legal framework strongly resembled that of Jersey including the signing of a
treaty with the US.
8To be precise, the STD applies not only to banks but also to other economic operators making interest payments to
individuals, e.g. mutual funds, duciaries and nancial companies other than banks.
8
As emphasized by the European Commission (2008), the Savings Directive has a limited scope and tax
evaders may circumvent its provisions in a number of ways. Firstly, geographical coverage is partial, hence
moving assets to a non-participating jurisdiction is a simple and e¤ective evasion strategy. Secondly,
since the Savings Directive includes no substance-over-form test, transferring the formal ownership of
assets to a trust in a non-participating jurisdiction su¢ ces to fall outside its scope. Thirdly, investors may
engage in a type of income shifting whereby interest bearing assets are replaced with structured nance
products with returns linked to leading interest rates. In substance, such derivatives are identical to debt
claims, yet returns are not formally interest payments and are therefore not subject to the provisions of
Savings Directive.
3 Data
The principal source of information on cross-border deposits is the International Locational Banking
Statistics of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which reports quarterly data on assets
and liabilities of banks vis-a-vis foreign counterparts. The data are based on reports from individual
banks compiled and aggregated by central banks and transmitted to the BIS. Currently, a total of 40
jurisdictions contribute to the banking statistics including most OECD countries, a handful of newly
industrialized countries and a number of o¤shore nancial centers. Among the o¤shore jurisdictions
covered by the Savings Directive, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, Netherland Antilles, Jersey,
Guernsey and Isle of Man also report to the BIS. For the former four jurisdictions, our dataset covers
the period from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the rst quarter of 2008; for the latter three jurisdictions,
the rst observation is the fourth quarter of 2001. Observations are end-of-quarter and report values in
US dollar equivalents.
We are ultimately interested in the behavioral responses to the Savings Directive and therefore
construct a measure that matches the tax base of the source tax as closely as possible. The dataset
contains breakdowns of bank liabilities on: (i) residence countries of counterparts; (ii) bank and non-
bank counterparts, (iii) deposits and other liabilities, (iv) currency denomination. Exploiting (i)-(iii), we
dene DEPbst as the USD value of deposits held by the non-bank sector in country s in banks in country
b at time t. The measure excludes other liabilities than deposits since income from the corresponding
assets may not qualify as interest under the Savings Directive and inter-bank deposits since the source
tax only applies to interest income earned by households. For ease of reference, we shall simply use the
term foreign depositsfor the deposits measured by DEPbst. For some reporting countries, including
Cayman Islands and Netherlands Antilles, the breakdown of bank liabilities on the residence country of
the counterparts is known by BIS but condential and not included in our dataset, hence DEPbst cannot
be constructed for these jurisdictions.9
9The bilateral deposit data used in this paper are not publicly available, however, deposit data aggregated over individual
banking or saver countries are posted on the BIS website. For Switzerland, some bilateral data are publicly available on
the website of the Swiss central bank. Specically, the Swiss central bank reports: (i) Ordinary deposits (on-balance sheet)
held by foreign non-banks; (ii) Fiduciary liabilities (o¤-balance sheet) vis-a-vis foreign residents. Although the BIS data for
9
The sectoral breakdown does not allow for a distinction between subgroups within the non-bank
sector, hence DEPbst has the undesirable feature that it includes deposits held by rms. In the case
of Switzerland, there is reason to believe that foreign deposits are held predominantly by households
suggesting that the latter issue is of minor importance: The extraordinarily large stocks of foreign
deposits attracted by Swiss banks (documented below) strongly indicates that the bulk of these deposits
are driven by tax evasion. However, the use of Swiss bank accounts to evade taxes on interest income
is much less straightforward for rms than for households because nancial transactions are reected
in accounts that need the approval of an external auditor. In any case, to the extent that DEPbst
overstates the true value of deposits held by households, it causes our estimates of behavioral elasticities
to be biased towards zero.
Table 1 lists the 10 jurisdictions with the largest stocks of foreign deposits prior to implementation
of the Savings Directive. Not surprisingly, large OECD countries such as the UK, the US and Germany
attracted very considerable amounts of foreign deposits. A group of much smaller countries, Cayman
Islands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Singapore and Jersey, is also in the top-10. Interestingly, the small
countries that attract many foreign deposits all provide a high level of legal protection to foreign tax
evaders.
Figure 1 illustrates how stocks of foreign deposits in Swiss banks (ALL) evolved over the sample
period. Since the agreement between the EU and Switzerland on the Savings Directive was concluded
toward the end of 2004, we consider 2004q4 a natural reference observation prior to which behavioral
e¤ects are unlikely to have occurred. We thus refer to observations before 2004q4 as pre-reformand
observations after 2004q4 as post-reformand indicate the observation for 2004q4 with a vertical line
in the gure. A simple comparison of pre-reform and post-reform time trends in foreign deposits does
not reveal a negative e¤ect of the source tax. On the contrary, the average annual growth rate in Swiss
foreign deposits was considerably higher in post-reform years (9.3% in 2004-2006) than in pre-reform
years (3.5% in 1996-2004).10 Since the source tax only applies to EU residents and not to non-EU
residents, it is natural to compare time trends for the two groups separately. To control for the changing
composition of the EU, we depict Swiss deposits held by residents of the 15 EU member states as of the
beginning of the sample period (EU15) and Swiss deposits held by residents of the non-EU member
states as of the end of the sample period (NON-EU). In pre-reform years (1996-2004), the average
annual growth of Swiss deposits held by EU residents and non-EU residents was roughly similar (2.3%
vs. 4.2%). Moreover, the simple correlation between quarterly growth rates for EU15 and NON-EU in
Switzerland and the data published by the Swiss central bank draw on the same underlying reports by individual banks,
it is not possible to reconstruct the BIS data for Switzerland with the publicly available data from the Swiss central bank
owing to the following three characteristics of the latter data: Firstly, the data are annual and not quarterly. Secondly, the
data contain no breakdown of duciary liabilities on banks and non-banks nor on deposits and other liabilities. Thirdly,
observations for some jurisdictions are missing until 2005. Despite these qualications, it is possible to construct a (more
noisy) measure of the tax base of the source tax by adding (i) and (ii). Footnote 16 reports results from an application of
our empirical framework to this publicly available measure of foreign deposits in Swiss banks.
10To smooth seasonal and random variation in the deposit variable over quarters, average annual growth rates are
computed as growth rates in annual average levels.
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the period 1995q4 to 2004q4 was 0.66 providing some evidence of an underlying common trend in Swiss
deposits for the two groups. Coinciding with the introduction of the source tax, there was a remarkable
divergence in trends for EU residents and non-EU residents as evidenced by very dissimilar average
annual growth rates (-9.1% vs. 19.2%) in post-reform years (2004-2006).
4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy exploits that the Savings Directive changed the tax environment of EU residents
with Swiss deposits while leaving non-EU residents with Swiss deposits una¤ected. This allows us to
apply a natural experiment methodology where the post-reform behavior of non-EU residents is used to
proxy for the counterfactual post-reform behavior of EU residents in the absence of the Savings Directive.
A key assumption in this type of framework is the ex ante comparability of control group and treatment
group. While EU residents and non-EU residents di¤er in many respects, some of which we shall attempt
to control for in the robustness checks, a crucial advantage of the Swiss institutional environment is the
universality of the legal provisions protecting foreign tax evaders. The bilateral tax treaties to which
Switzerland was party during our period of analysis include only very minor concessions, hence the
(very limited) legal basis for provision of information to foreign tax administrations derives from Swiss
domestic law, which applies universally to all foreigners regardless of their country of residence.
The empirical model simply estimates fully exible time trends for deposits held by EU residents
and non-EU residents respectively and any divergence in the two trends around the time the Savings
Directive was implemented is interpreted as a causal e¤ect of the source tax. Essentially, this is an
extended version of the canonical two-period di¤erence-in-di¤erences model. The empirical model thus
looks in the following way:
log(DEPst) = +
X
sDs +
X
tDt +
X
tDt DEU + "st
where Ds is a set of country specic dummies, Dt is a set of time dummies and DEU is a dummy taking
the value one when s is an EU member state and zero otherwise. In the central regressions, we focus on
Swiss deposits, hence DEPst = DEPbst for observations with b = Switzerland.
The timing of the negotiations and the implementation of the Savings Directive is crucial for the
interpretation of the estimates. The source tax applies to interest income earned as from 1 July 2005.
In order to avoid the source tax, EU residents with Swiss bank deposits therefore needed to adopt an
avoidance strategy on 30 June 2005 or before. Since the bilateral agreements with Switzerland were
concluded in late 2004, we assume that anticipatory responses largely occurred after 31 December 2004
and eliminate the time dummy for 2004q4, which becomes the reference quarter of the regression. To
the extent that tax evaders were unaware of the Savings Directive prior to implementation, we should
expect additional learning responses after 1 July 2005 as tax evaders received bank statements showing
that interest income accruing to Swiss bank accounts had been subject to a withholding tax.
The estimated treatment e¤ect for a given post-reform quarter t is captured by bt. It is easy to
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see that bt is a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator since it expresses the growth in Swiss deposits held
by EU residents since 2004q4 over and above the growth in Swiss deposits held by non-EU residents
since 2004q4. The interpretation of bt as the causal e¤ect of the source tax rests on the identifying
assumption that the value of Swiss deposits held by EU residents and non-EU residents respectively
would have followed identical growth paths after 2004q4 in the absence of the Savings Directive, or
equivalently, that estimating the model in a counterfactual world without the source tax would have
yielded zero-estimates of t for post-reform quarters. There is no rigorous way to test this identifying
assumption. However, it seems natural to use information from pre-reform quarters to assess its validity.
In order for the identifying assumption that the value of Swiss deposits of EU residents and non-EU
residents would have followed identical growth paths after 2004q4 in the absence of the Savings Directive
to be credible, they should follow roughly similar growth paths until 2004q4. This implies that the
estimates of t should generally be small and statistically insignicant for pre-reform quarters.
Even when the requirement of similar deposit growth paths in pre-reform years is satised, it is a
cause of concern that divergence in deposit growth paths in post-reform years could be caused by a
shock, which coincided with implementation of the Savings Directive and a¤ected treatment and control
groups di¤erently. Clearly, this would invalidate the identifying assumption since the e¤ects of such a
shock would wrongly be attributed to the source tax. The most obvious shocks to take into account are
the enlargements of the European Union. On 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007, a total of 12 countries
entered the EU raising the number of member states from 15 to 27.11 Importantly, the new member
states adopted the entire complex of bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland including free
trade agreements and agreements on the free movement of persons and capital. It is very plausible that
these agreements had a strong independent e¤ect on the value of Swiss bank deposits held by residents
of the accession countries, which the reduced form model does not allow us to disentangle from the e¤ect
of the Savings Directive. Most regressions therefore exclude the 12 accession countries from the sample
and the treatment group reduces to the 15 original EU countries (EU15). For the sake of completeness,
separate results for the 10 countries joining the EU in 2004 (NEW10) are also presented despite the
ambiguity concerning the interpretation of these results.
In the baseline regressions, the control group includes all jurisdictions where tax evaders were unaf-
fected by the source tax throughout the period of analysis, that is all jurisdictions except the 27 current
EU countries (NON-EU). We also consider a number of di¤erent subsamples, each of which excludes
certain jurisdictions in order to enhance comparability between treatment and control groups in a spe-
cic dimension. Firstly, we estimate the model with a control group that includes only OECD countries
(OECD). Arguably, this reduces the risk that an asymmetric shock coinciding with the implementation
of the Savings Directive and a¤ecting industrialized and developing countries di¤erentially invalidates
the identifying assumption. Secondly, we use a control group that excludes o¤shore nancial centers
(non-OFC). This addresses the concern that transfer of formal ownership of Swiss deposits to o¤shore
11Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia entered the EU
on 1 May 2004 whereas Bulgaria and Romania became EU member states on 1 January 2007.
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trusts, an avoidance technique discussed above, may have increased observed stocks of Swiss deposits
held by residents of o¤shore nancial centers. Finally, we use a control group that excludes countries
with a high share of GDP deriving from resource rents (non-RES). This reduces the risk that the rapid
surge in commodity prices during the period 2004-2007 a¤ected the relative size of Swiss deposits held
by EU residents and non-EU residents in the control group.
Exchange rate uctuations deserve particular attention since they mechanically a¤ect the USD equiv-
alent value of bank deposits denominated in other currencies. In particular, a depreciation (appreciation)
of USD against other currencies mechanically increases (decreases) the USD equivalent of assets denomi-
nated in those other currencies. Since the currency denominations of Swiss deposits held by EU residents
and non-EU residents di¤ered markedly, signicant exchange rate changes around the time the Savings
Directive was implemented would invalidate the identifying assumption. We exploit the currency break-
down of the deposit dataset to address this concern. Specically, letting DEPsta denote the USD value
of Swiss deposits denominated in currency a held by non-bank residents of country s at time t, we run
separate regressions with DEPsta as dependent variable for each of the major currencies.
As a nal note on the identication strategy, it should be emphasized that we rely crucially on the
assumption that non-EU residents are una¤ected by the Savings Directive. Although the provisions
of the Savings Directive do not directly apply to non-EU residents, it cannot be excluded that non-
EU residents are a¤ected by general equilibrium e¤ects. For instance, if the source tax induced EU
residents to reduce their deposits in Swiss banks, the latter may have responded by raising deposit rates,
which, in turn, may have a¤ected stocks of foreign deposits. This particular possibility should not be a
major concern, however, since indirect e¤ects working through deposit rates presumably have the same
impact on the treatment group and the control group thus leaving the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator
unbiased. More generally, we expect general equilibrium e¤ects to be negligible since deposits of EU
residents constitute a small fraction of the total balance sheet of Swiss banks.12
The log-level formulation of the model implies that zero-observations are generally treated as missing.
A common way to deal with this problem is to add a small number to the dependent variable before
taking logarithms. In our context where parameters are identied by growth rates, however, this would
introduce a potentially serious bias. Adding a positive number to a variable attenuates percentage
changes in an asymmetric way in the sense that attenuation is stronger at low levels. Since the average
level of DEPst is signicantly lower in the control group than in the treatment group, this procedure
would thus manipulate growth rates in the dependent variable in a way that would be correlated with
treatment. Noting that zero-observations constitute less than 7% of the observations in the full sample
of Swiss bank deposits and even less in some subsamples, we generally allow zeroes to be treated as
missing observations.13 To make sure that our results are not driven by changes in the composition of
12According to banking statistics reported by the Swiss central bank, liabilities in the form of deposits (on-balance sheet)
vis-a-vis EU resident non-banks and duciary liabilities (o¤-balance sheet) vis-a-vis EU residents constituted around 0.5%
and 1.6% respectively of the total balance of Swiss banks at the end of 2005 (due to missing data for France, these gures
may not be computed for earlier years).
13For instance, there are no missing observations in the subsample of OECD countries
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the sample, we carry out robustness checks where a balanced sample property is imposed by excluding
jurisdictions with at least one zero-observation from the sample.
We estimate the model using OLS. As forcefully argued by Bertrand et al. (2004), OLS standard
errors may seriously understate the true standard deviation of the estimated treatment e¤ect in the
presence of serial correlation. Arguably, the problem is less severe in the present case since there are
time dummies on the right-hand side rather than a persistent treatment variable. We nevertheless follow
the recommendation of Bertrand et al. (2004) and present standard errors that are robust to serial
correlation.14
5 Results
5.1 Main results
In the baseline regression, we estimate the model with a sample that includes all jurisdictions except the
12 countries entering the EU in 2004 and 2007. E¤ectively, this estimation uses the 15 EU member states
as of 1 January 2004 (EU15) as a treatment group and all other jurisdictions than the 27 EU member
states as of 1 January 2007 (NON-EU) as a control group. The regression results are illustrated in
gure 2 (numerical results in Appendix - panel A). The two lines in the gure represent the estimated
trends in Swiss deposits held by EU15 and NON-EU respectively. The dashed vertical line indicates the
reference quarter 2004q4. Under the identifying assumption that trends for EU15 and NON-EU would
have followed the same paths absent the Savings Directive, the vertical distances between the two trend
lines in post-reform quarters are the estimated treatment e¤ects. The columns indicate the statistical
signicance levels (p-values) of the interaction terms Dt  DEU . The dashed horizontal line indicates
the 5% signicance level.
There is a remarkable similarity in trends for EU15 and NON-EU in pre-reform quarters followed by
a striking divergence around the time the Savings Directive was implemented. Clear signs of divergence
appear between observations 2005q1 and 2005q2 (i.e. between 31 March 2005 and 30 June 2005) where
growth rates in the value of Swiss deposits were 3,4% and -13,5% for control group and treatment group
respectively. Recalling that the source tax was introduced on 1 July 2005, we interpret this as an
anticipatory behavioral e¤ect. The strong divergence continues between observations 2005q2 and 2005q3
(i.e. between 30 June 2005 and 30 September 2005) with growth rates of 4,6% and -13,8% for NON-EU
and EU15 respectively. This is probably best understood as a mix of anticipatory e¤ects and learning
e¤ects. The source tax applies to interest income earned as from 1 July 2005, which implies that the tax
cost of adopting an avoidance strategy shortly after this date was negligible. This suggests that some
tax evaders anticipating the source tax might have adopted other evasion strategies shortly after 1 July
2005, which would be captured by the interaction term for 2005q3. In the subsequent four quarters (i.e.
between 30 September 2005 and 30 September 2006), the average quarterly growth rate in the value
of Swiss deposits was markedly lower for EU15 than for the NON-EU. We interpret this as a learning
14This is implemented in Stata with the cluster command clustering on country of residence s.
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e¤ect in the sense that tax evaders with Swiss deposits adopted other evasion strategies after learning
about the withholding tax on Swiss source interest income through bank statements or otherwise. In
the remaining quarters, growth rates for NON-EU and EU15 were roughly similar. As indicated by the
columns in the gure, interaction terms are clearly insignicant for all quarters up to 2005q1 and highly
statistically signicant for all quarters as from 2005q2 supporting the visual impression that NON-EU
and EU15 followed similar paths until 2005q1 and then diverged sharply.
Estimates of the treatment e¤ect in this specication are summarized in the rst column of table
2. The choice of an appropriate time window for evaluating treatment e¤ects is associated with the
usual trade-o¤: A shorter window increases the risk that the estimated treatment e¤ect does not capture
all behavioral responses whereas a longer window increases the risk that the estimated treatment e¤ect
includes the e¤ects of other shocks. In light of this trade-o¤, we report treatment e¤ects for time windows
of di¤erent length: The treatment e¤ect evaluated at the end of 2005q3 is around 33%.15 Essentially, this
estimate only reects behavioral responses taking place during the quarter immediately before and the
quarter immediately after the implementation date and thus represents a conservative estimate, which is
very unlikely to be contaminated by other events. Extending the time window by another four quarters
to the end of 2006q3 yields an estimate of the treatment e¤ect of around 44%. By covering a period
where most holders of Swiss bank deposits received bank statements indicating that a withholding tax
had been levied on their interest income, this estimate presumably picks up additional learning e¤ects.
Averaging treatment e¤ects over the four quarters of 2006 gives rise to an estimated treatment e¤ect of
41.6%. Since the latter estimate is smoothing seasonal and random variation in deposits over quarters,
it represents our preferred estimate of the treatment e¤ect.16
We also estimate the model using the 10 countries that entered the EU on 1 May 2004 (NEW10)
as treatment group and NON-EU as control group. As discussed earlier, the legal complex adopted
by accession countries included bilateral agreements with Switzerland eliminating barriers to the free
movement of goods, persons and capital, which presumably had a strong positive e¤ect on Swiss bank
deposits held by residents of these countries. Since the bilateral agreements came into force shortly
before we would expect anticipatory responses to the Savings Directive, the regression results should be
interpreted with caution.
The results are illustrated in gure 3 (numerical results in Appendix - panel B). Time trends for
NON-EU and NEW10 are fairly similar from 2000 through 2004 and relatively clear signs of divergence
appear around the time the Savings Directive was implemented. Between observations 2005q1 and
2005q3 (i.e. between 31 March 2005 and 30 September 2005), growth rates in the value of Swiss deposits
15The treatment e¤ect for period t is computed as exp(0) exp(bt) for post-STD values of t where 0 under the identifying
assumption is the expected, counterfactual value of bt absent the STD.
16Estimating the model with the publicly available data from the website of the Swiss Central Bank described in footnote
9 yields very similar results. The data are end-of year and cover the period 2002-2008. We let 2004 be the reference year
and omit time dummies for this year. In line with the reported results for the baseline model, the interaction terms for 2002
and 2003 are statistically insignicant whereas interaction terms for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 are statistically signicant
at the 1% level with implied treatment e¤ects in the range -44% to -37%.
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were 8,2% and -12,1% for NON-EU and NEW10 respectively. Supporting this interpretation of the
gure, interaction terms for all quarters from 2000q1 through 2004q4 are clearly insignicant whereas
interaction terms for 2005q3-2006q1 are negative and statistically signicant. After 2005q4, the average
growth rate in the value of Swiss deposits is higher for NEW10 than for NON_EU and the two time
trends converge again. Interaction terms for all quarters as from 2006q2 are statistically insignicant.
Since the identifying assumption that time trends for NON-EU and NEW10 would have been similar
absent the Savings Directive is not credible in light of the almost simultaneous adoption of bilateral
agreements with a potentially large impact on Swiss deposits, we refrain from interpreting coe¢ cients
on interaction terms as causal e¤ects of the source tax. It is reassuring, however, that in the short time
window where we should expect behavioral responses to the source tax to be strongest, the divergence in
time trends for NON-EU and NEW10 is statistically signicant and not much smaller than the divergence
in the time trends for NON-EU and EU15.
5.2 Robustness checks
As a rst robustness check of the large treatment e¤ects found for the treatment group EU15, we estimate
the model with a control group that only includes OECD member states (OECD). This reduces the size
of the control group from 177 countries to 10 countries, however, arguably increases the comparability
between treatment and control groups by excluding developing countries from the sample. The results
are illustrated in gure 4 (numerical results in Appendix - panel C). Somewhat surprisingly in light of
the very considerable reduction in sample size, the results are almost identical to the baseline results.
As reported in the second column of table 2, the implied treatment e¤ects are 36.3% and 44.8% when
evaluating at the end of 2005q3 and 2006q3 respectively and 41.1% when averaging over the four quarters
of 2006.
We also estimate the model with Swiss deposits denominated in each of the four major currencies
EUR, USD, CHF and GBP separately.17 As noted earlier, exchange rate uctuations mechanically
a¤ect the USD equivalent value of bank deposits in other currencies. Since the currency composition of
Swiss deposits di¤ered considerably between EU residents and non-EU residents, signicant exchange
rate changes around the time the Savings Directive was implemented could potentially invalidate our
identifying assumption. Under the assumption that there were no behavioral responses to the source tax
and the treatment e¤ects estimated in the baseline model exclusively reect exchange rate movements, we
should nd zero treatment e¤ects in the currency specic regressions. Under the alternative assumption
that the treatment e¤ects estimated in the baseline model reect true behavioral responses, we should
nd negative treatment e¤ects in at least some of the currency specic regressions and, moreover, the
weighted average of these currency specic treatment e¤ects should be roughly identical to the baseline
treatment e¤ect when weights equal the currency shares in the total value of Swiss deposits held by
17 In 2004q4, more than 95% of Swiss deposits were denominated in one of these four currencies. Not surprisingly, there
were substantial di¤erences in the currency composition between EU15 (EUR: 46%; USD: 26%; CHF: 16%; GBP: 9%) and
NON-EU (EUR: 20%; USD: 62%; CHF: 6%, GBP: 8%).
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EU residents. The results are illustrated in gure 5a-5d (numerical results in Appendix - panel D-G).
Although patterns di¤er across currencies, the trends for EU15 and NON-EU clearly diverge around
2005q2-2005q3 for all four currencies. As reported in table 2, the implied treatment e¤ects range from
-20.5% (CHF) to -44.7% (GBP) when evaluated at the end of 2005q3 and from -25.8% (CHF) to -56.9%
(GBP) when evaluated at the end of 2006q3. Table 2 also displays weighted averages of the currency
specic treatment e¤ects using currency shares in Swiss deposits held by EU residents as of 2004q4
as weights. The weighted averages are remarkably similar to the treatment e¤ects from the baseline
regression suggesting that the latter results are not to any signicant extent driven by exchange rate
movements.
Turning to a caveat related to the notion of compositional change, we recall that transferring the
formal ownership of interest bearing assets to a trust located in a jurisdiction not covered by the Savings
Directive allows EU residents to escape the source tax. The use of this particular avoidance technique
poses a threat to our identication strategy since it translates into a drop in foreign deposits held by EU
residents and an increase in foreign deposits held by non-EU residents, the latter causing the di¤erence-
in-di¤erences estimators to su¤er from an upward bias. In an attempt to address this concern, we identify
the jurisdictions most likely to host trust business and construct a modied control group that excludes
these jurisdictions. Due to recent legislative innovation, most of the global trust business is now located
in o¤shore jurisdictions.18 We thus estimate the model with an alternative control group that excludes
46 o¤shore nancial centers (NON-OFC) as classied by the IMF (Zorome, 2007). As reported in table
2, implied treatment e¤ects with control group NON-OFC are only slightly smaller than the baseline
results.19
A specic shock to the world economy more or less coinciding with the implementation of the Savings
Directive was a rapid surge of commodity prices.20 Since EU countries are net importers and non-EU
countries are net exporters of primary commodities, there is a risk that the commodity price boom had
an independent e¤ect on the size of foreign assets held by EU residents relative to the size of foreign assets
held by non-EU residents, which could potentially invalidate our identifying assumption. To address this
concern, we use data from the World Development Indicators database on the value of rents associated
with extraction of fossil fuels and minerals to construct a control group that excludes countries with a
high share of GDP deriving from resource rents (NON-RES). Specically, we estimate the model with a
sample that excludes 21 countries where resource rents accounted for more than 30% of GDP in 2004. As
reported in table 2, treatment e¤ects with control group NON-RES are almost identical to the baseline
results.
We conduct two nal robustness checks with the Swiss deposit data. As discussed earlier, the log-level
18Lorenzetti (1997) argues that o¤shore trusts have two main advantages over onshore alternatives. Firstly, they o¤er
better asset protection from the claims of creditors (e.g. tax administrations). Secondly, they allow the settlor to retain a
large degree of control over assets even in the case of discretionary trusts.
19Due to space constraints, we do not list numerical results for this regression and the following robustness checks but
simply report implied treatment e¤ects.
20According to the IMF Primary Commodity Price Index, average commodity prices more than doubled from 2004 to
2008.
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formulation of the model implies that zero-observations are treated as missing. To make sure that our
results are not driven by changes in the composition of the sample, we carry out robustness checks where
a balanced sample property is imposed by excluding jurisdictions with at least one zero-observation from
the sample (BAL). Moreover, the fact that DEPbst is reported in integer number of USD millions
introduces some measurement error, which is particularly pronounced for country pairs where the level
of DEPbst is low. There is a priori no reason to believe that this type of measurement error should
be correlated with treatment and rounding should therefore not bias our estimates. As a crude test of
whether observations with potentially large measurement errors inuence the results, we estimate the
model with a control group that excludes countries for which stocks of Swiss deposits take values below
10 million dollars in any quarter during the sample period (10MIO). As reported in table 2, implied
treatment e¤ects are almost identical to the baseline estimates.
5.3 Other banking jurisdictions
As a nal robustness check, we apply the same empirical framework to Luxembourg and Jersey. These are
both o¤shore jurisdictions providing foreign tax evaders with a high level of protection against detection
and are both among the ten jurisdictions in the world that attract most foreign deposits. For each of
the two banking jurisdictions, we estimate the model using EU15 as treatment group and NON-EU and
OECD as control groups in two separate regressions.21
Firstly, we consider Luxembourg. The regression results with control group NON-EU are illustrated in
gure 6 (numerical results in Appendix - panel I). There are some signs of divergence around the time the
Savings Directive was implemented. Specically, between observations 2005q1 and 2005q4 (i.e. between
31 March 2005 and 31 December 2005), growth rates in the value of Luxembourg deposits were 1,6%
and -16,1% for NON-EU and EU15 respectively. Interaction terms in post-reform quarters, however, are
in most cases statistically insignicant. The regression results with control group OECD are illustrated
in gure 7 (numerical results in Appendix - panel J). In the same three quarters 2005q1-2005q4, the
growth rate was 35,4% for OECD suggesting a much larger treatment e¤ect than when using the control
group NON-EU. It should be noted, however, that average growth rates in Luxembourg deposits during
the years prior to implementation of the Savings Directive were higher for OECD than for EU15, which
casts some doubt on the identifying assumption of similar growth rates in post-reform quarters absent the
21Although in principle our methodology is applicable to any banking jurisdiction for which bilateral deposit data is
available, we limit the analysis to jurisdictions where there are strong a priori reasons to believe that a large fraction of
foreign deposits is owned by tax evaders. In such jurisdictions behavioral responses by tax evaders translate into relatively
large and detectable changes in DEPst whereas in jurisdictions where foreign tax evaders account for a small fraction of
total foreign deposits even considerable behavioral responses to the Savings Directive cause relatively little and hardly
detectable variation in DEPst. In other words, since we are unable to distinguish deposits owned by evaders and non-
evaders in the data, analyzing jurisdictions that attract many tax motivated deposits increases the statistical power of the
tests. Moreover, only in cases where we have strong priors that a large fraction of total deposits is owned by tax evaders,
it is natural to interpret the estimated tax elasticity of DEPst as an approximation to the theoretically relevant evasion
elasticity. It would have been natural to include the Cayman Islands in the analysis, however, our dataset does not contain
bilateral deposit data for this jurisdiction.
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Savings Directive. Moreover, coe¢ cients have large standard errors and interaction terms in post-reform
quarters are not consistently signicant at the 5% level. In table 3, we report the estimated treatment
e¤ects in Luxembourg for di¤erent time windows. Treatment e¤ects are in the range -15% to -10% when
using NON-EU as control group and in the range -32% to -27% when using OECD as control group.
Secondly, we consider Jersey. The regression results are illustrated in gure 8-9 (numerical results in
Appendix - panel K-L). In both gures, there are strong signs of divergence between observations 2005q1
and 2005q3 (i.e. between 31 March 2005 and 30 September 2005). A peculiar feature of the trend line
for EU15 is the spikes in 2006q2 and 2007q4. Both spikes are due to sudden increases in Jersey deposits
from a few jurisdictions (i.e. Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg) followed by a decrease of a similar
magnitude in the next quarter. In terms of statistical signicance, we note that interaction terms for all
quarters after 2005q2 (except the two quarters with spikes) are highly signicant. Estimated treatment
e¤ects for Jersey are reported in table 3 and fall in the range -30% to -17% for control group NON-EU
and -32% to -22% for control group OECD.
5.4 Implied behavioral elasticities
Our preferred estimate of the reduction in Swiss deposits caused by the Savings Directive is around 42%.
The 15% source tax reduced the net-of-tax rate from 1 to 0.85, hence the implied elasticity of Swiss
bank deposits with respect to the net-of-tax rate is around 2.75. Our other estimates of the reduction in
Swiss deposits caused by the Savings Directive range from -45% to -30% thus implying a tax elasticity
of Swiss bank deposits in the interval 2-3. In Luxembourg and Jersey, the tax elasticity of foreign bank
deposits implied by the results varies between 0.7 and 2 depending on the time window and the control
group.
As noted earlier, the source tax only a¤ects evading households whereas rms fall outside the scope
of the tax and non-evading households may easily avoid the tax by allowing o¤shore banks to disclose
information that is self-reported to the tax authorities in any case. To the extent that our empirical
measure of o¤shore deposits DEPbst also includes other types of deposits, the responsiveness of tax
evaders is even higher than suggested by the above estimates. Assuming, for instance, that 20% of
the o¤shore deposits captured by the empirical deposit measure were held by rms and non-evading
households, the estimated reduction in total Swiss deposits of around 42% corresponds to a reduction
in deposits held by evading households of around 52% implying a tax elasticity of around 3.5. In other
words, the fact that our empirical measure of o¤shore deposits is broader than the tax base to which
the source tax applies means that the elasticity estimates presented above are lower bounds for the true
responsiveness of tax evaders with o¤shore deposits.
6 Concluding remarks
The main aim of the paper was to estimate the impact of the Savings Directive on Swiss bank deposits
held by EU residents. We found very robust results suggesting that the 15% source tax on interest
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income introduced by the Savings Directive caused Swiss bank deposits of EU residents to decrease by
more than 40% corresponding to an elasticity of deposits with respect to the net-of-tax rate around
2.75. We also presented less conclusive evidence suggesting somewhat smaller e¤ects in Luxembourg and
Jersey.
There are important reasons to believe that the estimated reduction in o¤shore deposits reected
substitution towards other evasion strategies rather than increased compliance. Firstly, most EU coun-
tries apply a tax rate on capital income that by far exceeds the 15% tax on o¤shore source interest
income introduced by the Savings Directive. From the perspective of tax evaders, maintaining an o¤-
shore bank account thus clearly dominated compliance in terms of tax costs. Secondly, since the Savings
Directive did not include an amnesty clause, choosing to disclose funds for tax purposes would entail a
substantial risk of legal sanctions relating to tax evasion in previous years. Finally, as discussed above,
other evasion strategies were readily available. For these reasons, we believe that our results represent
a relatively clean estimate of the substitutability of tax evasion strategies in the context of the Savings
Directive. Arguably, the e¢ ciency loss associated with substitution towards other evasion strategies is
counterbalanced by an e¢ ciency gain due to increased compliance. This gain is presumably dynamic
in nature in the sense that the source tax likely deters future tax evasion rather than causes existing
o¤shore deposits to be repatriated. Our empirical framework is not suited to provide an estimate of the
compliance e¤ect of the Savings Directive.
As is often the case with estimates of behavioral elasticities derived in non-structural frameworks,
the question of external validity arises. Clearly, the extent to which tax evaders are able to circumvent
measures against tax evasion depends partly on the degree of sophistication of tax evaders and partly on
the particular design of the measures themselves, hence our sizable estimates of the responsiveness of tax
evasion strategies do not necessarily carry over to other types of policy measures. In some dimensions,
such as the denition of interest income and the test of benecial ownership, the scope of the Savings
Directive is certainly narrow, which presumably increases the substitutability between targeted and
non-targeted evasion strategies. On the other hand, the Savings Directive is a rare example of a truly
multilateral reform comprising a large group of tax havens and other nancial centers. Presumably,
the behavioral responses of tax evaders to an otherwise similar bilateral reform would have been even
larger since substitution towards bank deposits in non-targeted jurisdictions would have been easier. In
this light, the high degree of substitutability between di¤erent tax evasion strategies found in this paper
suggests that substitution severely limits the e¤ectiveness of policy measures against tax evasion.
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Appendix A - Tables and Figures
Table 1: Foreign deposits by banking jurisdiction in 2004 (USD billions)
United Kingdom 882,0
United States 514,6
Cayman Islands 475,9
Germany 400,1
Switzerland 331,0
Luxembourg 165,2
Belgium 158,2
Singapore 141,0
Spain 134,3
Jersey 114,6
ALL 4224,9
Note: The annual level is computed as a simple average over quarters
Table 2: Estimated treatment effects for Switzerland
Treatment group EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15
Control group NON-EU OECD NON-EU NON-EU NON-EU NON-EU NON-EU NON-OFC NON-RES BAL 10MIO
Currency denomination ALL ALL EUR USD CHF GBP Average ALL ALL ALL ALL
Column I II II IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Evaluation
 - 30 sepember 2005 -33,3% -36,3% -35,6% -33,8% -20,5% -44,7% -33,4% -32,2% -32,0% -34,6% -32,9%
 - 30 sepember 2006 -44,3% -44,8% -42,0% -51,6% -25,8% -56,9% -43,2% -42,1% -43,6% -42,7% -42,6%
 - average 2006 -41,6% -41,1% -42,5% -48,2% -22,9% -55,6% -41,9% -39,8% -40,8% -40,9% -40,0%
Table 3: Estimated treatment effects for Luxembourg and Jersey
Banking country Luxembourg Luxembourg Jersey Jersey
Treatment group EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15
Control group NON-EU OECD NON-EU OECD
Currency denomination ALL ALL ALL ALL
Column I II III IV
Time window
 - 30 sepember 2005 -11,5% -26,7% -30,4% -32,0%
 - 30 sepember 2006 -14,9% -31,7% -28,3% -31,0%
 - average 2006 -9,5% -27,8% -16,8% -21,7%
Figure 1: Foreign deposits in Swiss banks 
 
 
Figure 2: Swiss deposits, EU15 vs. NON-EU 
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Figure 3: Swiss deposits, NEW10 vs. NON-EU 
 
 
Figure 4: Swiss deposits, EU15 vs. OECD 
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Figure 5c: CHF denominated Swiss deposits 
 
Figure 5d: GBP denominated Swiss deposits 
  
 
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
95q4 96q4 97q4 98q4 99q4 00q4 01q4 02q4 03q4 04q4 05q4 06q4 07q4
EU15
NON-EU
E[DEPs,t] / E[DEPs,2004q4 ]
p=1.00
p=0.05
Note: Lines indicate trends in DEPst as captured by coefficients on time dummies Dt and interaction terms Dt*DEU, specifically exp(γt) for NON-EU and 
exp(γt+λt) for EU15 (left axis). Columns indicate statistical significance levels of interaction terms Dt*DEU (right axis).
Significance level of 
interaction term Dt*DEU
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
95q4 96q4 97q4 98q4 99q4 00q4 01q4 02q4 03q4 04q4 05q4 06q4 07q4
EU15
NON-EU
E[DEPs,t] / E[DEPs,2004q4 ]
p=1.00
p=0.05
Note: Lines indicate trends in DEPst as captured by coefficients on time dummies Dt and interaction terms Dt*DEU, specifically exp(γt) for NON-EU and 
exp(γt+λt) for EU15 (left axis). Columns indicate statistical significance levels of interaction terms Dt*DEU (right axis).
Significance level of 
interaction term Dt*DEU
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
95q4 96q4 97q4 98q4 99q4 00q4 01q4 02q4 03q4 04q4 05q4 06q4 07q4
EU15
NON-EU
E[DEPs,t] / E[DEPs,2004q4 ]
p=1.00
p=0.05
Note: Lines indicate trends in DEPst as captured by coefficients on time dummies Dt and interaction terms Dt*DEU, specifically exp(γt) for NON-EU and 
exp(γt+λt) for EU15 (left axis). Columns indicate statistical significance levels of interaction terms Dt*DEU (right axis).
Significance level of 
interaction term Dt*DEU
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
95q4 96q4 97q4 98q4 99q4 00q4 01q4 02q4 03q4 04q4 05q4 06q4 07q4
EU15
NON-EU
E[DEPs,t] / E[DEPs,2004q4 ]
p=1.00
p=0.05
Note: Lines indicate trends in DEPst as captured by coefficients on time dummies Dt and interaction terms Dt*DEU, specifically exp(γt) for NON-EU and 
exp(γt+λt) for EU15 (left axis). Columns indicate statistical significance levels of interaction terms Dt*DEU (right axis).
Significance level of 
interaction term Dt*DEU
Figure 6: Luxembourg deposits, EU15 vs. NON-EU 
 
 
Figure 7: Luxembourg deposits, EU15 vs. OECD 
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Figure 8: Jersey deposits, EU15 vs. NON-EU 
 
 
Figure 9: Jersey deposits, EU15 vs. OECD 
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Significance level of 
interaction term Dt*DEU
Banking Jur
Treatment
Control
Currency
coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se
1995q4 -0.440*** (0.0819) 0.0944 (0.136) -0.440*** (0.0819) -0.789*** (0.119)
1996q1 -0.420*** (0.0797) 0.0821 (0.137) -0.420*** (0.0797) -0.692*** (0.131)
1996q2 -0.445*** (0.0816) 0.0624 (0.139) -0.445*** (0.0816) -0.677*** (0.129)
1996q3 -0.446*** (0.0784) 0.0690 (0.135) -0.446*** (0.0784) -0.620*** (0.135)
1996q4 -0.389*** (0.0792) 0.0569 (0.136) -0.389*** (0.0792) -0.595*** (0.149)
1997q1 -0.380*** (0.0801) 0.0336 (0.137) -0.380*** (0.0801) -0.622*** (0.161)
1997q2 -0.408*** (0.0777) 0.0371 (0.135) -0.408*** (0.0778) -0.507*** (0.164)
1997q3 -0.408*** (0.0741) 0.0776 (0.139) -0.408*** (0.0741) -0.428** (0.187)
1997q4 -0.401*** (0.0731) 0.0537 (0.134) -0.401*** (0.0731) -0.408** (0.183)
1998q1 -0.359*** (0.0730) 0.0139 (0.128) -0.359*** (0.0730) -0.450** (0.192)
1998q2 -0.388*** (0.0711) 0.0762 (0.132) -0.388*** (0.0711) -0.411** (0.185)
1998q3 -0.315*** (0.0710) 0.0462 (0.132) -0.315*** (0.0710) -0.402** (0.186)
1998q4 -0.310*** (0.0705) 0.0447 (0.118) -0.310*** (0.0706) -0.334** (0.155)
1999q1 -0.203*** (0.0685) 0.113 (0.118) -0.203*** (0.0685) -0.256** (0.129)
1999q2 -0.223*** (0.0677) 0.111 (0.118) -0.223*** (0.0677) -0.267** (0.131)
1999q3 -0.158** (0.0707) 0.0342 (0.106) -0.158** (0.0707) -0.307** (0.141)
1999q4 -0.201*** (0.0683) 0.0766 (0.0958) -0.201*** (0.0683) -0.235* (0.137)
2000q1 -0.321*** (0.0725) 0.176 (0.115) -0.321*** (0.0725) -0.184 (0.138)
2000q2 -0.365*** (0.0663) 0.107 (0.0912) -0.365*** (0.0663) -0.148 (0.123)
2000q3 -0.341*** (0.0595) 0.0177 (0.0876) -0.341*** (0.0595) -0.0904 (0.126)
2000q4 -0.291*** (0.0577) 0.0210 (0.0947) -0.291*** (0.0577) -0.0820 (0.103)
2001q1 -0.242*** (0.0514) 0.000959 (0.0896) -0.242*** (0.0514) -0.00155 (0.109)
2001q2 -0.235*** (0.0502) -0.0675 (0.0908) -0.235*** (0.0502) -0.00682 (0.108)
2001q3 -0.212*** (0.0488) -0.0286 (0.0886) -0.212*** (0.0488) -0.0594 (0.0981)
2001q4 -0.222*** (0.0480) -0.0725 (0.0786) -0.222*** (0.0480) -0.0648 (0.0896)
2002q1 -0.245*** (0.0478) -0.0691 (0.0648) -0.245*** (0.0478) -0.0471 (0.0908)
2002q2 -0.195*** (0.0463) -0.0795 (0.0687) -0.195*** (0.0464) -0.108 (0.0752)
2002q3 -0.196*** (0.0464) -0.0537 (0.0734) -0.196*** (0.0465) -0.109 (0.0772)
2002q4 -0.143*** (0.0470) -0.0824 (0.0678) -0.143*** (0.0470) -0.0940 (0.0734)
2003q1 -0.157*** (0.0434) -0.0330 (0.0626) -0.157*** (0.0434) -0.0126 (0.0744)
2003q2 -0.150*** (0.0414) -0.0264 (0.0621) -0.150*** (0.0415) -0.0406 (0.0582)
2003q3 -0.132*** (0.0364) -0.00591 (0.0572) -0.132*** (0.0364) -0.0109 (0.0552)
2003q4 -0.110*** (0.0390) 0.0214 (0.0477) -0.110*** (0.0390) -0.0364 (0.0490)
2004q1 -0.115*** (0.0369) 0.0175 (0.0495) -0.115*** (0.0369) -0.0170 (0.0484)
2004q2 -0.0972*** (0.0333) 0.0207 (0.0438) -0.0972*** (0.0333) -0.0372 (0.0438)
2004q3 -0.0819** (0.0354) 0.0276 (0.0482) -0.0819** (0.0354) -0.0334 (0.0424)
2004q4 - - - - - - - -
2005q1 -0.0124 (0.0261) -0.0323 (0.0293) -0.0124 (0.0261) 0.0626 (0.0414)
2005q2 0.0208 (0.0405) -0.211*** (0.0503) 0.0208 (0.0405) -0.0566 (0.0471)
2005q3 0.0663 (0.0412) -0.405*** (0.0627) 0.0663 (0.0412) -0.145** (0.0579)
2005q4 0.0959** (0.0381) -0.439*** (0.0678) 0.0959** (0.0381) -0.212*** (0.0537)
2006q1 0.136*** (0.0396) -0.481*** (0.0769) 0.136*** (0.0396) -0.153** (0.0733)
2006q2 0.239*** (0.0447) -0.533*** (0.0896) 0.239*** (0.0447) -0.102 (0.0893)
2006q3 0.299*** (0.0538) -0.585*** (0.0983) 0.299*** (0.0538) -0.0477 (0.109)
2006q4 0.375*** (0.0527) -0.555*** (0.118) 0.375*** (0.0527) -0.0790 (0.104)
2007q1 0.414*** (0.0568) -0.559*** (0.121) 0.414*** (0.0568) -0.130 (0.102)
2007q2 0.456*** (0.0580) -0.539*** (0.115) 0.456*** (0.0580) -0.0685 (0.112)
2007q3 0.498*** (0.0606) -0.515*** (0.116) 0.498*** (0.0606) -0.0159 (0.142)
2007q4 0.555*** (0.0618) -0.502*** (0.122) 0.555*** (0.0618) -0.125 (0.126)
2008q1 0.609*** (0.0624) -0.455*** (0.123) 0.609*** (0.0624) -0.0390 (0.127)
Observations
R.-squared
Note: Country dummies and constant term not reported. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
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86088858
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Panel B
Switzerland
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Panel A
NOT FOR PUBLICATION!!!
Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU)
Switzerland
NON-EU
ALL
EU15
Banking Jur
Treatment
Control
Currency
coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se
1995q4 -0.529*** (0.128) 0.184 (0.172) -0.667*** (0.107) 0.00956 (0.172)
1996q1 -0.495*** (0.107) 0.157 (0.158) -0.692*** (0.107) -0.0196 (0.173)
1996q2 -0.411*** (0.140) 0.0281 (0.183) -0.680*** (0.103) -0.0919 (0.175)
1996q3 -0.461*** (0.149) 0.0847 (0.189) -0.762*** (0.104) -0.0440 (0.179)
1996q4 -0.435*** (0.0940) 0.102 (0.149) -0.832*** (0.0988) 0.0647 (0.170)
1997q1 -0.461*** (0.0799) 0.115 (0.142) -0.784*** (0.0996) -0.0316 (0.176)
1997q2 -0.438*** (0.109) 0.0666 (0.159) -0.863*** (0.0960) -0.0224 (0.182)
1997q3 -0.409*** (0.121) 0.0789 (0.173) -0.912*** (0.0926) 0.00652 (0.188)
1997q4 -0.385*** (0.114) 0.0376 (0.164) -0.911*** (0.0935) -0.0432 (0.183)
1998q1 -0.361*** (0.126) 0.0157 (0.168) -0.899*** (0.0882) -0.0523 (0.172)
1998q2 -0.317*** (0.0887) 0.00598 (0.147) -0.951*** (0.0902) -0.00904 (0.169)
1998q3 -0.277*** (0.0790) 0.00788 (0.142) -0.888*** (0.0900) -0.0134 (0.170)
1998q4 -0.271*** (0.0845) 0.00545 (0.131) -0.742*** (0.0893) 0.0843 (0.141)
1999q1 -0.104 (0.0997) 0.0141 (0.143) -0.734*** (0.0865) 0.141 (0.139)
1999q2 -0.169* (0.0916) 0.0572 (0.137) -0.702*** (0.0878) 0.0831 (0.143)
1999q3 -0.176*** (0.0619) 0.0525 (0.103) -0.657*** (0.0859) 0.0822 (0.128)
1999q4 -0.171** (0.0679) 0.0469 (0.0981) -0.651*** (0.0846) 0.152 (0.116)
2000q1 -0.164** (0.0670) 0.0192 (0.116) -0.716*** (0.0890) 0.141 (0.125)
2000q2 -0.157** (0.0593) -0.101 (0.0887) -0.779*** (0.0833) 0.232* (0.125)
2000q3 -0.204*** (0.0605) -0.119 (0.0908) -0.775*** (0.0806) 0.156 (0.115)
2000q4 -0.163** (0.0704) -0.107 (0.106) -0.704*** (0.0768) 0.199* (0.115)
2001q1 -0.161** (0.0632) -0.0794 (0.0999) -0.604*** (0.0773) 0.123 (0.115)
2001q2 -0.128* (0.0706) -0.175 (0.107) -0.572*** (0.0708) 0.0375 (0.111)
2001q3 -0.135** (0.0544) -0.106 (0.0950) -0.516*** (0.0783) 0.111 (0.112)
2001q4 -0.149** (0.0671) -0.146 (0.0938) -0.461*** (0.0762) 0.00222 (0.108)
2002q1 -0.157** (0.0619) -0.157* (0.0772) -0.483*** (0.0725) 0.0125 (0.103)
2002q2 -0.113* (0.0566) -0.162** (0.0779) -0.347*** (0.0703) 0.00230 (0.0998)
2002q3 -0.136*** (0.0480) -0.114 (0.0768) -0.277*** (0.0667) -0.0513 (0.0939)
2002q4 -0.0804 (0.0925) -0.145 (0.106) -0.291*** (0.0626) 0.00178 (0.0919)
2003q1 -0.0855 (0.0872) -0.105 (0.0993) -0.189*** (0.0563) -0.0181 (0.0811)
2003q2 -0.0594 (0.0865) -0.117 (0.0992) -0.164*** (0.0541) -0.0206 (0.0785)
2003q3 -0.113* (0.0623) -0.0253 (0.0778) -0.146*** (0.0543) 0.00980 (0.0801)
2003q4 -0.0972* (0.0560) 0.00872 (0.0630) -0.166*** (0.0478) 0.0582 (0.0641)
2004q1 -0.0706 (0.0441) -0.0264 (0.0562) -0.0880* (0.0496) -0.0121 (0.0602)
2004q2 -0.0672* (0.0337) -0.00934 (0.0451) -0.0389 (0.0483) -0.0133 (0.0605)
2004q3 -0.0969* (0.0501) 0.0426 (0.0607) -0.0667* (0.0401) 0.0150 (0.0539)
2004q4 - - - - - - - -
2005q1 0.00688 (0.0263) -0.0516* (0.0298) 0.0344 (0.0343) -0.0293 (0.0387)
2005q2 0.0301 (0.0185) -0.220*** (0.0365) 0.109** (0.0509) -0.278*** (0.0590)
2005q3 0.112 (0.0697) -0.451*** (0.0857) 0.0792 (0.0543) -0.440*** (0.0729)
2005q4 0.120*** (0.0366) -0.463*** (0.0695) 0.144*** (0.0503) -0.515*** (0.0774)
2006q1 0.118*** (0.0232) -0.464*** (0.0732) 0.210*** (0.0505) -0.583*** (0.0829)
2006q2 0.272*** (0.0575) -0.566*** (0.1000) 0.311*** (0.0527) -0.574*** (0.0885)
2006q3 0.309*** (0.0620) -0.595*** (0.107) 0.294*** (0.0606) -0.544*** (0.102)
2006q4 0.320*** (0.0641) -0.501*** (0.128) 0.357*** (0.0573) -0.513*** (0.119)
2007q1 0.392*** (0.0651) -0.537*** (0.130) 0.379*** (0.0660) -0.472*** (0.131)
2007q2 0.373*** (0.0582) -0.456*** (0.120) 0.416*** (0.0670) -0.462*** (0.120)
2007q3 0.426*** (0.0588) -0.442*** (0.120) 0.525*** (0.0649) -0.470*** (0.111)
2007q4 0.499*** (0.0789) -0.446*** (0.136) 0.624*** (0.0693) -0.447*** (0.129)
2008q1 0.510*** (0.0710) -0.356** (0.132) 0.770*** (0.0656) -0.486*** (0.123)
Observations
R.-squared
Note: Country dummies and constant term not reported. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
1250 7674
0.983 0.938
OECD NON-EU
ALL EURO
Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU) Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU)
Panel C Panel D
Switzerland Switzerland
EU15 EU15
Banking Jur
Treatment
Control
Currency
coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se
1995q4 -0.396*** (0.0784) 0.289* (0.162) -0.0263 (0.0959) -0.0415 (0.198)
1996q1 -0.354*** (0.0778) 0.302* (0.158) -0.102 (0.0943) 0.0190 (0.191)
1996q2 -0.363*** (0.0769) 0.304* (0.156) -0.114 (0.0926) -0.0487 (0.187)
1996q3 -0.316*** (0.0729) 0.299** (0.146) -0.186** (0.0876) -0.0288 (0.184)
1996q4 -0.252*** (0.0737) 0.275* (0.150) -0.192** (0.0825) -0.0203 (0.178)
1997q1 -0.267*** (0.0756) 0.285* (0.160) -0.177** (0.0858) 0.0142 (0.183)
1997q2 -0.300*** (0.0749) 0.333** (0.150) -0.182** (0.0807) -0.0180 (0.187)
1997q3 -0.268*** (0.0743) 0.362** (0.161) -0.273*** (0.0864) 0.0724 (0.184)
1997q4 -0.246*** (0.0760) 0.352** (0.156) -0.336*** (0.0812) 0.116 (0.195)
1998q1 -0.215*** (0.0757) 0.340** (0.153) -0.316*** (0.0825) 0.0518 (0.185)
1998q2 -0.194*** (0.0715) 0.353** (0.149) -0.289*** (0.0803) 0.106 (0.231)
1998q3 -0.135* (0.0748) 0.319** (0.157) -0.171** (0.0844) 0.0724 (0.224)
1998q4 -0.130* (0.0757) 0.264* (0.155) -0.268*** (0.0772) 0.142 (0.194)
1999q1 -0.0596 (0.0795) 0.330** (0.158) 0.0997 (0.0661) 0.221 (0.175)
1999q2 -0.0752 (0.0767) 0.270* (0.159) 0.0365 (0.0637) 0.225 (0.182)
1999q3 -0.0531 (0.0775) 0.264* (0.138) 0.121* (0.0618) 0.0978 (0.115)
1999q4 -0.0841 (0.0804) 0.263** (0.132) 0.123* (0.0688) 0.0518 (0.190)
2000q1 -0.143* (0.0812) 0.314*** (0.121) -0.0468 (0.0731) 0.233 (0.232)
2000q2 -0.156** (0.0726) 0.273** (0.113) -0.279*** (0.0650) 0.127 (0.0968)
2000q3 -0.0963 (0.0697) 0.182 (0.112) -0.288*** (0.0675) 0.0348 (0.0993)
2000q4 -0.0942 (0.0644) 0.181 (0.122) -0.230*** (0.0681) 0.0515 (0.103)
2001q1 -0.0679 (0.0646) 0.227** (0.112) -0.143** (0.0565) -0.0489 (0.100)
2001q2 -0.0899 (0.0580) 0.180 (0.116) -0.144** (0.0643) -0.196** (0.0884)
2001q3 -0.0878 (0.0595) 0.146 (0.115) -0.0756 (0.0587) -0.148 (0.0951)
2001q4 -0.0622 (0.0545) 0.0324 (0.0947) -0.140*** (0.0528) -0.128 (0.0870)
2002q1 -0.111** (0.0553) 0.00387 (0.0897) -0.181*** (0.0572) -0.0684 (0.0741)
2002q2 -0.0935 (0.0568) -0.0228 (0.0806) -0.0552 (0.0502) -0.201*** (0.0764)
2002q3 -0.0874 (0.0538) 0.0209 (0.0871) -0.113** (0.0436) -0.181** (0.0730)
2002q4 -0.0640 (0.0550) -0.0714 (0.0770) -0.0719* (0.0414) -0.115 (0.0793)
2003q1 -0.166*** (0.0525) 0.0287 (0.0746) -0.0704* (0.0379) -0.129** (0.0631)
2003q2 -0.144*** (0.0496) 0.0294 (0.0713) -0.0471 (0.0377) -0.151** (0.0615)
2003q3 -0.167*** (0.0483) 0.0520 (0.0685) -0.0840** (0.0371) -0.0905 (0.0619)
2003q4 -0.125** (0.0511) 0.0861 (0.0617) -0.0715** (0.0343) -0.0231 (0.0460)
2004q1 -0.120** (0.0461) 0.0395 (0.0633) -0.0553* (0.0296) -0.0720 (0.0749)
2004q2 -0.110*** (0.0411) 0.0101 (0.0540) -0.0795*** (0.0270) -0.0479 (0.0564)
2004q3 -0.0740* (0.0387) 0.000610 (0.0525) -0.108*** (0.0319) 0.0449 (0.0870)
2004q4 - - - - - - - -
2005q1 -0.0247 (0.0339) -0.0924 (0.0562) -0.0150 (0.0263) -0.0557 (0.0647)
2005q2 -0.00274 (0.0479) -0.223*** (0.0700) -0.0195 (0.0288) -0.119 (0.0738)
2005q3 0.0466 (0.0486) -0.412*** (0.0830) 0.0155 (0.0331) -0.230*** (0.0623)
2005q4 0.0968** (0.0464) -0.517*** (0.0916) 0.00366 (0.0313) -0.187*** (0.0610)
2006q1 0.118** (0.0483) -0.545*** (0.110) 0.0288 (0.0359) -0.248*** (0.0722)
2006q2 0.220*** (0.0498) -0.665*** (0.129) 0.0846** (0.0410) -0.251*** (0.0798)
2006q3 0.303*** (0.0575) -0.726*** (0.127) 0.0833* (0.0462) -0.298*** (0.0724)
2006q4 0.382*** (0.0599) -0.706*** (0.155) 0.0992** (0.0454) -0.246*** (0.0868)
2007q1 0.440*** (0.0592) -0.736*** (0.148) 0.0790 (0.0507) -0.179* (0.0957)
2007q2 0.473*** (0.0609) -0.695*** (0.141) 0.150*** (0.0533) -0.226** (0.109)
2007q3 0.492*** (0.0650) -0.607*** (0.145) 0.140*** (0.0508) -0.205* (0.112)
2007q4 0.498*** (0.0673) -0.644*** (0.140) 0.179*** (0.0505) -0.172 (0.125)
2008q1 0.511*** (0.0680) -0.544*** (0.154) 0.360*** (0.0573) -0.236** (0.114)
Observations
R.-squared
Note: Country dummies and constant term not reported. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
0.9520.957
8621 7143
NON-EU NON-EU
USD CHF
Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU) Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU)
Panel E Panel F
Switzerland Switzerland
EU15 EU15
Banking Jur
Treatment
Control
Currency
coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se
1995q4 -0.658*** (0.107) 0.0332 (0.158) -0.334*** (0.0849) -0.0112 (0.138)
1996q1 -0.684*** (0.110) 0.0129 (0.167) -0.319*** (0.0797) -0.0190 (0.137)
1996q2 -0.635*** (0.108) -0.0646 (0.169) -0.350*** (0.0836) -0.0328 (0.140)
1996q3 -0.654*** (0.103) -0.110 (0.138) -0.366*** (0.0810) -0.0111 (0.137)
1996q4 -0.585*** (0.116) 0.0605 (0.145) -0.314*** (0.0832) -0.0181 (0.138)
1997q1 -0.602*** (0.110) 0.0763 (0.132) -0.277*** (0.0815) -0.0691 (0.138)
1997q2 -0.584*** (0.105) 0.0125 (0.149) -0.312*** (0.0785) -0.0592 (0.136)
1997q3 -0.530*** (0.0982) 0.0516 (0.157) -0.291*** (0.0740) -0.0393 (0.139)
1997q4 -0.536*** (0.106) 0.0352 (0.146) -0.288*** (0.0734) -0.0590 (0.134)
1998q1 -0.469*** (0.104) -0.0464 (0.140) -0.265*** (0.0761) -0.0799 (0.130)
1998q2 -0.448*** (0.0962) -0.114 (0.142) -0.299*** (0.0735) -0.0125 (0.133)
1998q3 -0.431*** (0.0976) -0.0848 (0.149) -0.237*** (0.0735) -0.0324 (0.134)
1998q4 -0.525*** (0.100) -0.0322 (0.153) -0.219*** (0.0716) -0.0467 (0.119)
1999q1 -0.497*** (0.0977) 0.0403 (0.178) -0.123* (0.0681) 0.0330 (0.118)
1999q2 -0.576*** (0.0959) 0.0788 (0.170) -0.156** (0.0661) 0.0439 (0.117)
1999q3 -0.609*** (0.0947) 0.203 (0.173) -0.0697 (0.0695) -0.0539 (0.105)
1999q4 -0.645*** (0.101) 0.170 (0.168) -0.109* (0.0625) -0.0148 (0.0919)
2000q1 -0.639*** (0.109) 0.0616 (0.146) -0.244*** (0.0697) 0.0991 (0.114)
2000q2 -0.548*** (0.0893) -0.0912 (0.120) -0.306*** (0.0643) 0.0481 (0.0898)
2000q3 -0.552*** (0.0937) -0.175 (0.132) -0.295*** (0.0591) -0.0283 (0.0874)
2000q4 -0.524*** (0.0872) -0.133 (0.134) -0.246*** (0.0609) -0.0238 (0.0968)
2001q1 -0.541*** (0.0816) -0.121 (0.126) -0.185*** (0.0531) -0.0556 (0.0906)
2001q2 -0.532*** (0.0836) -0.142 (0.127) -0.179*** (0.0515) -0.124 (0.0916)
2001q3 -0.521*** (0.0791) -0.134 (0.113) -0.173*** (0.0511) -0.0677 (0.0900)
2001q4 -0.492*** (0.0805) -0.168 (0.136) -0.202*** (0.0520) -0.0920 (0.0812)
2002q1 -0.548*** (0.0769) -0.130 (0.104) -0.226*** (0.0516) -0.0880 (0.0677)
2002q2 -0.498*** (0.0762) -0.129 (0.120) -0.189*** (0.0492) -0.0858 (0.0707)
2002q3 -0.508*** (0.0767) -0.124 (0.113) -0.173*** (0.0499) -0.0771 (0.0757)
2002q4 -0.468*** (0.0735) -0.0246 (0.114) -0.118** (0.0523) -0.108 (0.0716)
2003q1 -0.437*** (0.0736) 0.0184 (0.113) -0.130*** (0.0477) -0.0599 (0.0657)
2003q2 -0.406*** (0.0730) -0.0419 (0.104) -0.134*** (0.0459) -0.0427 (0.0652)
2003q3 -0.336*** (0.0728) 0.0229 (0.110) -0.117*** (0.0398) -0.0213 (0.0594)
2003q4 -0.350*** (0.0683) 0.0656 (0.0883) -0.0975** (0.0417) 0.00907 (0.0499)
2004q1 -0.230*** (0.0638) 0.0149 (0.0781) -0.111*** (0.0405) 0.0143 (0.0523)
2004q2 -0.127** (0.0513) -0.00845 (0.0814) -0.0941** (0.0375) 0.0176 (0.0471)
2004q3 -0.0521 (0.0383) 0.0423 (0.0741) -0.0798* (0.0418) 0.0255 (0.0531)
2004q4 - - - - - - - -
2005q1 0.00543 (0.0534) 0.0290 (0.0648) -0.0141 (0.0316) -0.0307 (0.0342)
2005q2 0.170*** (0.0567) -0.382*** (0.0882) 0.00819 (0.0486) -0.198*** (0.0570)
2005q3 0.167** (0.0680) -0.593*** (0.108) 0.0502 (0.0490) -0.389*** (0.0681)
2005q4 0.195*** (0.0722) -0.680*** (0.104) 0.0786* (0.0448) -0.421*** (0.0719)
2006q1 0.215*** (0.0686) -0.724*** (0.102) 0.107** (0.0457) -0.452*** (0.0803)
2006q2 0.291*** (0.0777) -0.817*** (0.112) 0.211*** (0.0521) -0.505*** (0.0936)
2006q3 0.339*** (0.0800) -0.842*** (0.122) 0.261*** (0.0625) -0.547*** (0.103)
2006q4 0.436*** (0.0831) -0.869*** (0.139) 0.346*** (0.0602) -0.526*** (0.121)
2007q1 0.457*** (0.0866) -0.877*** (0.140) 0.388*** (0.0660) -0.532*** (0.126)
2007q2 0.517*** (0.0883) -0.851*** (0.168) 0.429*** (0.0674) -0.512*** (0.121)
2007q3 0.552*** (0.0880) -0.840*** (0.160) 0.469*** (0.0705) -0.485*** (0.122)
2007q4 0.586*** (0.0898) -0.748*** (0.158) 0.527*** (0.0720) -0.475*** (0.127)
2008q1 0.565*** (0.0888) -0.795*** (0.154) 0.573*** (0.0723) -0.419*** (0.128)
Observations
R.-squared
Note: Country dummies and constant term not reported. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
5821 7411
0.931 0.967
NON-EU NON-OFC
GBP ALL
Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU) Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU)
Panel G Panel H
Switzerland Switzerland
EU15 EU15
Banking Jur
Treatment
Control
Currency
coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se
1995q4 -0.360*** (0.0978) 0.209 (0.198) -0.552 (0.324) 0.402 (0.371)
1996q1 -0.318*** (0.0985) 0.192 (0.207) -0.481* (0.272) 0.355 (0.332)
1996q2 -0.334*** (0.0905) 0.230 (0.197) -0.398 (0.267) 0.294 (0.325)
1996q3 -0.320*** (0.0923) 0.135 (0.214) -0.258 (0.289) 0.0733 (0.354)
1996q4 -0.314*** (0.0867) 0.134 (0.196) -0.475* (0.254) 0.295 (0.314)
1997q1 -0.368*** (0.0835) 0.0946 (0.187) -0.554** (0.252) 0.281 (0.307)
1997q2 -0.336*** (0.0779) 0.0822 (0.191) -0.488* (0.257) 0.234 (0.316)
1997q3 -0.344*** (0.0778) 0.0452 (0.175) -0.472* (0.253) 0.174 (0.303)
1997q4 -0.303*** (0.0796) 0.0454 (0.169) -0.484* (0.256) 0.227 (0.300)
1998q1 -0.281*** (0.0818) 0.0321 (0.167) -0.511* (0.248) 0.262 (0.291)
1998q2 -0.253*** (0.0797) 9.67e-05 (0.154) -0.432 (0.267) 0.179 (0.301)
1998q3 -0.253*** (0.0797) 9.67e-05 (0.154) -0.432 (0.267) 0.179 (0.301)
1998q4 -0.271*** (0.0738) 0.0137 (0.151) -0.426* (0.231) 0.169 (0.269)
1999q1 -0.334*** (0.0770) 0.0302 (0.156) -0.470* (0.238) 0.166 (0.278)
1999q2 -0.343*** (0.0788) -0.0822 (0.140) -0.478** (0.231) 0.0530 (0.262)
1999q3 -0.300*** (0.0769) 0.0206 (0.145) -0.475* (0.233) 0.195 (0.266)
1999q4 -0.256*** (0.0761) -0.110 (0.139) -0.492** (0.227) 0.126 (0.258)
2000q1 -0.304*** (0.0828) -0.0550 (0.155) -0.569*** (0.185) 0.209 (0.231)
2000q2 -0.318*** (0.0798) -0.0732 (0.139) -0.558** (0.216) 0.167 (0.247)
2000q3 -0.316*** (0.0789) -0.00716 (0.123) -0.630*** (0.193) 0.307 (0.217)
2000q4 -0.259*** (0.0801) -0.0296 (0.118) -0.586*** (0.200) 0.297 (0.220)
2001q1 -0.263*** (0.0724) -0.0922 (0.129) -0.502*** (0.0909) 0.146 (0.145)
2001q2 -0.290*** (0.0738) -0.120 (0.123) -0.505*** (0.0964) 0.0956 (0.141)
2001q3 -0.224*** (0.0713) -0.113 (0.120) -0.362*** (0.0812) 0.0253 (0.131)
2001q4 -0.230*** (0.0716) -0.171 (0.110) -0.476*** (0.113) 0.0746 (0.143)
2002q1 -0.300*** (0.0678) -0.0583 (0.0995) -0.521*** (0.114) 0.163 (0.137)
2002q2 -0.258*** (0.0625) 0.0186 (0.103) -0.455*** (0.123) 0.215 (0.150)
2002q3 -0.246*** (0.0630) -0.0738 (0.0845) -0.415*** (0.116) 0.0959 (0.131)
2002q4 -0.232*** (0.0618) 0.0387 (0.0945) -0.419*** (0.0784) 0.226** (0.109)
2003q1 -0.160*** (0.0544) -0.113 (0.0936) -0.318*** (0.0934) 0.0449 (0.123)
2003q2 -0.135*** (0.0509) 0.0773 (0.0814) -0.273*** (0.0821) 0.215* (0.106)
2003q3 -0.0601 (0.0459) -0.0227 (0.0889) -0.221*** (0.0639) 0.138 (0.103)
2003q4 -0.0169 (0.0419) 0.0108 (0.0614) -0.147* (0.0787) 0.141 (0.0918)
2004q1 -0.0894** (0.0361) 0.0760 (0.0592) -0.141 (0.0888) 0.127 (0.102)
2004q2 -0.0894*** (0.0341) 0.0487 (0.0657) -0.180* (0.0962) 0.140 (0.113)
2004q3 -0.0987*** (0.0292) 0.0674 (0.0461) -0.0436 (0.0897) 0.0122 (0.0973)
2004q4 - - - - - - - -
2005q1 0.0404 (0.0311) 0.00171 (0.0470) 0.00509 (0.0833) 0.0371 (0.0912)
2005q2 -0.00566 (0.0350) -0.0259 (0.0721) 0.157 (0.127) -0.188 (0.143)
2005q3 0.0557 (0.0470) -0.122 (0.0842) 0.244 (0.152) -0.310* (0.169)
2005q4 0.0558 (0.0517) -0.189* (0.1000) 0.308* (0.152) -0.441** (0.177)
2006q1 0.0271 (0.0399) -0.0434 (0.136) 0.194 (0.144) -0.210 (0.198)
2006q2 0.0747* (0.0421) -0.105 (0.133) 0.318** (0.135) -0.348* (0.189)
2006q3 0.121*** (0.0430) -0.161 (0.147) 0.340** (0.159) -0.381* (0.217)
2006q4 0.205*** (0.0447) -0.0923 (0.180) 0.487*** (0.166) -0.374 (0.248)
2007q1 0.234*** (0.0474) -0.255** (0.125) 0.381*** (0.126) -0.402** (0.175)
2007q2 0.258*** (0.0527) -0.235* (0.140) 0.385*** (0.116) -0.362* (0.179)
2007q3 0.366*** (0.0559) -0.200 (0.166) 0.549** (0.207) -0.383 (0.265)
2007q4 0.374*** (0.0591) -0.173 (0.121) 0.585*** (0.204) -0.385 (0.232)
2008q1 0.406*** (0.0613) -0.0957 (0.121) 0.587*** (0.206) -0.276 (0.233)
Observations
R.-squared
Note: Country dummies and constant term not reported. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
0.9550.953
7735 1236
NON-EU OECD
ALL ALL
Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU) Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU)
Panel I Panel J
Luxembourg Luxembourg
EU15 EU15
Banking Jur
Treatment
Control
Currency
coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se coefficient se
1995q4
1996q1
1996q2
1996q3
1996q4
1997q1
1997q2
1997q3
1997q4
1998q1
1998q2
1998q3
1998q4
1999q1
1999q2
1999q3
1999q4
2000q1
2000q2
2000q3
2000q4
2001q1
2001q2
2001q3
2001q4 -0.308*** (0.0679) -0.113 (0.139) -0.317* (0.174) -0.104 (0.215)
2002q1 -0.0609 (0.0639) -0.218* (0.126) 0.0622 (0.192) -0.341 (0.223)
2002q2 -0.0734 (0.0614) -0.205* (0.117) -0.0550 (0.195) -0.224 (0.221)
2002q3 -0.0906 (0.0644) -0.210* (0.117) -0.119 (0.155) -0.182 (0.185)
2002q4 -0.0198 (0.0623) -0.176** (0.0770) -0.0817 (0.144) -0.115 (0.151)
2003q1 0.00636 (0.0702) 0.0117 (0.167) 0.0132 (0.121) 0.00488 (0.199)
2003q2 0.00715 (0.0690) 0.0728 (0.140) 0.0314 (0.0728) 0.0486 (0.147)
2003q3 -0.0266 (0.0517) 0.0307 (0.133) 0.0585 (0.0518) -0.0545 (0.139)
2003q4 0.0498 (0.0500) -0.0374 (0.137) 0.0975* (0.0538) -0.0850 (0.145)
2004q1 0.0935* (0.0494) 0.0125 (0.110) 0.106* (0.0537) -0.000354 (0.116)
2004q2 0.0106 (0.0359) 0.0758 (0.0977) 0.0558 (0.0519) 0.0307 (0.108)
2004q3 0.0104 (0.0382) 0.0769 (0.0984) 0.0817 (0.0489) 0.00570 (0.107)
2004q4 - - - - - - - -
2005q1 0.00639 (0.0405) 0.0396 (0.0581) 0.168*** (0.0381) -0.122** (0.0579)
2005q2 0.156*** (0.0431) -0.227*** (0.0748) 0.192*** (0.0468) -0.263*** (0.0794)
2005q3 0.251*** (0.0509) -0.363*** (0.0922) 0.273*** (0.0585) -0.386*** (0.0996)
2005q4 0.198*** (0.0399) -0.298*** (0.0562) 0.297*** (0.0628) -0.398*** (0.0753)
2006q1 0.221*** (0.0487) -0.285*** (0.0745) 0.335*** (0.0816) -0.399*** (0.101)
2006q2 0.295*** (0.0415) 0.154 (0.214) 0.343*** (0.0692) 0.106 (0.230)
2006q3 0.299*** (0.0517) -0.332*** (0.106) 0.338*** (0.0609) -0.371*** (0.115)
2006q4 0.367*** (0.0484) -0.370*** (0.0766) 0.412*** (0.0642) -0.415*** (0.0894)
2007q1 0.441*** (0.0520) -0.425*** (0.0889) 0.598*** (0.165) -0.582*** (0.181)
2007q2 0.485*** (0.0549) -0.552*** (0.193) 0.587*** (0.0718) -0.654*** (0.207)
2007q3 0.534*** (0.0517) -0.558*** (0.185) 0.644*** (0.0935) -0.668*** (0.209)
2007q4 0.525*** (0.0616) 0.0580 (0.220) 0.583*** (0.0791) 0.000834 (0.235)
2008q1 0.538*** (0.0562) -0.546*** (0.185) 0.668*** (0.102) -0.676*** (0.211)
Observations
R.-squared
Note: Country dummies and constant term not reported. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
4200 676
0.965 0.973
NON-EU OECD
ALL ALL
Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU) Time dummies (Dt) Interaction terms (Dt*EU)
Panel K Panel L
Jersey Jersey
EU15 EU15
